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In this paper, we introduce a new quantum bit commitment protocol which is secure against entangle-
ment attacks. A general cheating strategy is examined and shown to be practically ineffective against the
proposed approach.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
Quantum cryptography in the sense of key distribution was ﬁrst
introduced in [1] with the BB84 protocol. The authors also pro-
posed a bit commitment scheme which they determined was not
secure. Construction of an unconditionally secure quantum bit
commitment technique has since become an important research
problem. There have been many commitment schemes created,
as well as a number of results on the impossibility of perfectly se-
cure commitment [2,6,7]. Even teleportation has been considered
to achieve unconditional security [3]. Recently, ‘‘practically’’ secure
commitment schemes [4] have been examined, rather than asymp-
totically secure protocols. By practical it is simply meant that the
security is very hard to break rather than impossible. This paper
considers practically secure bit commitment, as is the case with
classical commitment schemes.
Consider a two party (Alice and Bob) bit commitment. Alice
chooses a bit b 2 {0,1}, locks it and sends it to Bob (commitment
phase). When it is the time to reveal b (opening phase), Bob locks
the bit with his own lock (i.e., he locks the bit locked by Alice), and
sends it back to Alice. She then opens her lock and sends the bit
back to Bob and announces b. Bob then opens his lock and checks
whether the locked bit b is the same as the one which was
announced.
Here we propose a simple scheme using the principles of the
well-known Difﬁe-Hellman key exchange protocol (details of this
protocol can be found in [5]). However, we employ multiplication
by a unitary transform instead of exponentiation in a multiplica-
tive group modulo a prime. Although this commitment scheme
also falls within the category for which entanglement cheating isheikholeslam), agullive@ece.
-NC-ND license.a proof of insecurity, (since it satisﬁes the criteria based on the
simpliﬁed Yao model [8] as described in [7]), it is practically very
hard for Alice to cheat. This is due to the fact that constructing
the unitary transform required to apply on her share of the entan-
gled pair can be made infeasible, as will be shown.
Before presenting our bit-commitment protocol, we will ﬁrst
deﬁne practical security. For this, we need the following.
1.1. Binding experiment (BE)
 Alice and Bob share a system HA  HB and a protocol P for
which the ﬁnal state before the opening phase is qAB 2 HA  HB.
 A cheating Alice performs the operation A  I[qAB] and reveals
b R{0,1} to Bob (A is a trace preserving operation).
 Bob then performs the operation (actually a measurement)
I  B[qAB] to obtain b0.
 The outcome of the experiment is 1 (success) if b = b0 and 0 (fail)
otherwise.
Deﬁnition 1.1. A protocol p is computationally binding (CB) if for
all polynomial time quantum operations Alice can perform we
have Pr BEApð1nÞ ¼ 1
h i
6 12þ neglðnÞ, where negl(n) is a negligible
function of the secrecy parameter n and 1n denotes a string of n
qubits.
Note that in the above deﬁnition, polynomial time is with re-
spect to the dimension of the Hilbert space. Bob and Alice are using
(i.e., n, which is the number of qubits in the strings used to repre-
sent 0 and 1).
Proposition 1.2. If a protocol is CB then there is no collection of
circuits {Qxjx 2 S} (where S is any string), which can be generated in
polynomial time that can closely approximate the operation A.
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Achieving CB security is a general task and Alice may employ
different approaches in an attempt to compromise the security of
a protocol. One important case is an EPR attack by Alice. EPR at-
tacks [7] have been proven to make all quantum bit commitment
schemes theoretically insecure. Therefore we introduce the notion
of EPR-Computationally Binding (EPR-CB).
Deﬁnition 1.3. A protocol p is EPR-Computationally Binding (EPR-
CB) if for all polynomial time quantum operations by Alice,
Pr BEApð1nÞ ¼ 1
h i
6 12þ neglðnÞ, where negl(n) is a negligible function
of the secrecy parameter n. Note that Alice is only capable of
entangling an ancillary system in the corresponding Hilbert space,
and can perform unitary transforms and POVM (Positive Operator
Valued Measure) measurements on her system before the opening
phase.Proposition 1.4. CB is equivalent to EPR-CB if a cheating Alice can
extend any system to a larger system in polynomial time.Proof. Obviously, any EPR-CB protocol is also CB. It is known that
all trace preserving quantum operations on a Hilbert space can be
extended to a higher dimensional system in which these opera-
tions can be reduced to a unitary transform. Therefore, a cheating
Alice can extend a system and then perform a unitary transform. A
general CB experiment on a Hilbert space Hn is equivalent to a (uni-
tary and POVM) CB experiment on a Hilbert space Hm where
mP n. Therefore EPR-CB security is equivalent to CB security. h
This proposition is important as it connects the concept of bind-
ing to EPR security.
Deﬁnition 1.5. An ensemble of protocols P = {p1,    ,pn} is com-
putationally binding (CB) if all pi 2P are CB.
An ensemble of protocols is required because if there is only one
protocol for which the bit commitment is CB, a cheating Alice can
prepare the necessary circuit for changing the qubit in advance and
use it at the time of commitment.
2. The proposed bit commitment protocol
In this section, we present the proposed method of bit commit-
ment. With this protocol, each party ﬁrst prepares a secret unitary
operator. It is assumed that a quantum channel as well as a classi-
cal side-channel is available, as with other bit commitment
schemes. The qubits are exchanged through the quantum channel,
while the side-channel is used to exchange the secret unitary oper-
ators in the opening phase. The proposal can then be described as
follows.
 Commitment phase:
– Bob prepares two previously agreed upon orthogonal states
j/0i, j/1i, and applies his secret transform UB on them. He
sends these to Alice and tells her which to use if she wants
to commit 0 or 1.
– Alice prepares UA  UBj/0i or UA  UBj/1i and sends
j/i 2 {UA  UBj/0i, UA  UBj/1i} back to Bob depending on the
bit she wants to share.
 Opening phase:
– Alice reveals her unitary transform UA to Bob through the
classical channel.– Bob computes jwi = UB  UAj/i and checks if it agrees with the
committed qubit.
Note that the secret unitary transforms can be chosen at random
from a continuous subset of the unitary group. As an example, we
can assume that j/0i = j0i and j/1i = j1i, and UA, UB 2 {Rx(h), Ry(h),
Rz(h)} where Rx(h) is a rotation about the x axis with an angle h.
3. Security and cheating strategies
One approach for Alice to attempt to cheat is to apply a unitary
transform UA during the committing phase but then send V  UA
during the opening phase (where V is another unitary transform),
such that when Bob tries to open the commitment he receives a
bit other than the one which was committed (say Alice has com-
mitted j/0i but now wants Bob to open j/1i). For Alice to be suc-
cessful in cheating, the following must be true for the last step of
the opening phase
jwi ¼ UB  V  UA  UA  UBj/0i ¼ j/1i ) UB  V  UB ¼ j/1ih/0j:
This shows that Alice can construct such a transform V only if she
knows the secret transform of Bob. By a similar analysis, Bob cannot
determine the state j/ii if he only knows UA  UBj /ii.
Theorem 3.1. The proposed protocol is practically secure against an
EPR (entanglement) attack by Alice.Proof. Let jAi and jBi denote the uniform superposition of all pos-
sible UA and UB on j/ii. In other words, assuming UA and UB are con-
trolled gates and j Ai and jBi are the corresponding control
registers, we have a register (jAi or jBi) which is a superposition
of all possible choices of the unitary transformations by Alice and
Bob (i.e., jAi ¼PUiAj/0i where UiA
n o
is the set of all possible UA).
Considering these registers at the end of the commitment phase,
we have
jw0i ¼
X
A
X
B
jBiUAUBj/0i  UAUBj/1ijAi;
jw1i ¼
X
A
X
B
jBiUAUBj/1i  UAUBj/0ijAi;
where jw0i denotes 0 and jw1i denotes 1. In each state, the compo-
nent on the right side of the tensor product is possessed by Alice.
Now, if the protocol is secure against Bob then the local trace over
the system components of Alice must be equal for both jw0i and
jw1i. As a result, considering the Schmidt decomposition [9], we
have a unitary transform V on Alice’s side which can take values
from jw0i to jw1i. In order for Alice to produce V, she must know
all possible choices for UB (but she does not need to know a partic-
ular choice of UB). The existence of V shows that the protocol is not
theoretically secure, but the two parties can hide their sets of uni-
tary transforms and make the protocol practically secure against
an entanglement attack. This protocol is practically secure because
in order to construct jBi, one has to construct an arbitrary unitary
operation on n qubits to take a state (say j0i) to jBi. It has been
shown that this requires O n24nlogc n24
n

  
gates in order to
approximate such a transformation within distance  [9]. h
Note that there is a trade off between the security and time
complexity of this protocol, as is the case for other security
protocols.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, we proposed a simple but secure bit commitment
protocol which is based on the application of secret unitary trans-
S. Arash Sheikholeslam, T. Aaron Gulliver / Results in Physics 2 (2012) 97–99 99forms by each party (Alice and Bob) in succession. Cheating strat-
egies, including entanglement cheating, were examined and the
system was shown to be effective against these attacks.
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